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WHAT AGENCIES ARE EXEMPT FROM THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT?
Frank C. Newman*
The federal Administrative Procedure Act is riddled with exemptions.
They affect sections, subsections, clauses, sub-clauses; and there is extensive
literature concerning them.2 Exemptions that apply to the APA as a whole,
however, are few; and lawyers specially concerned with the health of the ad-
ministrative process have labored to keep them few.'
This article will argue, illustratively, that the United States Commission
on Civil Rights is not exempt from the APA. To the contrary, a recent de-
cision article in Volume 35 of the NOTRE DAME LAWYER states, "The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act . . . applies only to agencies which are engaged
in rule-making or adjudication; since the Civil Rights Commission does neither,
it is not subject to the procedural provisions of the APA."4 The authority
the writer cites does not support those conclusions,' but his view is mirrored
in recent pronouncements of the United States Department of Justice.' This
article is a hopeful attempt to forestall some damage that could result from
that prestigious sponsorship.
There is a fair argument that the Civil Rights Commission does not ad-
judicate within the meaning of the APA.7 But to say that it does not make
rules seems strange when one of the Commission's most important documents
- A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Juris. Sc. D.; Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958) (hereafter called the APA).
2 See miscellaneous references in 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 554-55
(1958); Ginnane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 621 (1947); Nathanson, Some Comments on the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. REV. 368 (1946). Concerning agencies' effecting
exemptions by coerced waiver agreements see Note, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960).
3 See HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE
143 (1955); ABA, ADMIN. LAW BULL. 198 (No. 9, 1956).
4 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 440 (1960); accord, 6 How. L. J. 86, 87 (1960) ("the
Act does not apply"). [For a more extended treatment of administrative investigatory powers
under the APA, see Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 77 (1959). Ed.]
5 The reference given is footnote 3 of Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816, 819
(W.D. La. 1959). In that footnote, however, the court pronounced only with respect to
§ 7 of the APA (though its discussion concededly is fuzzy). The writer in the NOTRE DAME
LAWYER does not restrict his comments to § 7, and in his footnote 2 cites that section as
merely one example of procedural rights granted to witnesses by the APA. Other rights
appear in § 6, and this article argues that the Commission must respect those rights even
though it is not governed by § 7.
6 See Hearings on Federal Registrars before the Senate Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 610, 629-31 (1960) (excerpts from Appellants' Brief and
Reply Brief in Hannah v. Larche).
7 APA § 2(d) states: "'[A]djudication' means agency process for the formulation of
an order"; and "'Order' means . . . the final disposition . . . of any agency in any matter
other than rule-making but including licensing." A decision to issue a subpena could be
regarded as a "final disposition" in an investigatory matter (i.e., a "matter other than rule-
making"), but the point is doubtful.
Less doubtful is the argument that an agency decision to publicize information which
defames, degrades, or incriminates a person is "the final disposition . .. of . . .[a] matter
other than rule-making." But the Supreme Court, unaided by thoughtful briefs, apparently
rejected that argument in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). Cf. Newman, Due Process
Investigations, and Civil Rights, 10 J. PUBLIC L. 000 (1961); Rourke, Law Enforcement
Through Publicity, 24 U. CI. L. REv. 225 (1957).
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states (after reciting procedural provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957),
"In addition to these statutory provisions, the Commission has adopted the
following supplementary Rules of Procedure . . . [eleven of them, on three
mimeographed sheets]."'8, Most startling is the suggestion that the Commission,
whose primary duty is to "investigate" (with subpenas when appropriate),'
is exempt from section 6(b) of the APA, which governs "investigations," and
section 6 (c), which governs "subpenas."
What Is An "Agency"?
How does the Department of Justice justify ignoring Sections 6(b) and
(c) and the rule-making requirements of the APA? "[T]he Commission on
Civil Rights," said the Solicitor General last year, "is not an 'agency' with-
in the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act.,; . ."" Why not? Ap-
parently: first, because section 2(a) defines "agency" as "each authority";"
second, because the Senate Judiciary Committee reported that " 'authority'
means any officer or board ... which by law has authority to take final and
binding action with or without appeal to some superior administrative au-
thority" ;1 and third, because Congressman Walter stated that "whoever has
the authority to act with respect to the matters later defined is an agency.""
Therefore, concluded the Solicitor General, we should exclude the Civil Rights
Commission from the APA because "[it], of course, can take no final or bind-
ing action with respect to 'the matters later defined,' i.e., rule-making and
adjudication. . . . [I]t neither makes rules (other than those relating to its
procedures)"4 nor adjudicates."'"
What has been assumed, inexplicably, is that only rule-making and ad-
judication are "the matters later defined." Even if Congressman Walter by
that phrase meant merely the formal definition sections (and not section 6,
for example), why was section 2(g) overlooked, which section defines "agency
action" as including not just the products of rule-making and adjudication but
"the whole or part of every rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent
or denial thereof, or failure to act"? What are to be regarded, say, as sanctions?
Declares section 2(f) :
"'Sanction' includes the whole or part of any agency (1) pro-
hibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the
8 Rules of Procedure for Hearings of the Commission on Civil Rights, July 1, 1958, p. 3.
9 Sections 104(a) (1) and 105(f) of the Civil Rights Act, 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42
U.S.C. §§ 1975c (a) (i) and 1975d (f) (1958).
10 Hearings on Federal Registrars, supra note 6, at 631.
11 "'Agency' means each authority (whether or not within or subject to review by
another agency) of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts,
or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia."
12 Hearings an Federal Registrars, supra note 6, at 630.
13 Id. at 631.
14 This parenthetical clause ("other than those relating to its procedures") is quixotic.
Congress clearly intended that procedural rule-making should be subject to ,the APA. See
§§ 3(a) (2) and 4(d), for instance. Does the Department of Justice now propose to repeal
those requirements by parenthetical allusion? Cf. Hearings on Federal Registrars, supra note
6, at 629 rn4.
15 Id. at 631. The Civil Rights Commission does, of course (within the meaning of the
Senate Judiciary Report, text preceding note 12, supra), take "final or binding action" with
respect to subpenas. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363 (1942).
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freedom of any person; (2) withholding of relief; (3) imposition
of any form of penalty or fine; (4) destruction, taking, seizure, or
withholding of property; (5) assessment of damages, reimburse-
ment, restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees; (6) require-
ment, revocation, or suspension of a license; or (7) taking of other
compulsory or restrictive action."
In good conscience can we conclude that a subpena is not a "taking of
. . . compulsory . . . action"? That would surely obfuscate section 6, which
by no stretch of the imagination is limited to rule-making and adjudicatory
proceedings, 6 and which includes several requirements affecting not only sub-
penas, but also any "other investigative act or demand." Given the definitions
of "agency action" and "sanction" quoted above, would the Department of
Justice argue, too, that agencies like the Civil Rights Commission are exempt
even from this comprehensive requirement of section 6(a)?
So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, any inter-
ested person may appear before any agency or its responsible officers
or employees for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of
any issue, request, or controversy in any proceeding (interlocutory,
summary, or otherwise) or in connection with any agency function.
Those words "any agency" and "any agency function" are noteworthy. They
scarcely denote "any agency that is engaged in adjudication or non-procedural
rule-making."
Accordingly, I submit that the Civil Rights Commission is subject to the
APA. The reasons stated have been textual, for the statute's words seem clear.
If we posit ambiguity, though, are there in the congressional history, the ad-
ministrative experience, or the relevant judicial opinions any hints whatever
that Congress would not have wanted this kind of agency to publish its rules
in the Federal Register, for instance, or to observe the general requirements
applicable to subpenas and other investigative acts, or to recognize the informal
right to "appear" guaranteed by section 6(a), just quoted? Obviously not.
The Solicitor General's excerpt from Congressman Walter's speech alone tells
us that. "[T]here are excluded legislative, judicial, and territorial authorities,"
said the Congressman. "ifihere is included any other authority regardless of
its form or organization. In short, whoever has the authority to act with respect
to the matters later defined is an agency."' 7
16 See United States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293, 294 (D. Conn. 1949): "The adjudicative
functions of the Internal Revenue Bureau are specifically exempted from the [Administrative
Procedure] Act. It is significant that the [APA] section on ancillary matters is not so
exempted." The Solicitor General apparently overlooked the Smith case. To support his
conclusion that "Section 6 . . . on its face applies only to ancillary functions of those
governmental bodies whose functions come within the principal provisions of the Act" (Hear-
ings on Federal Registrars, supra note 6, at 629 n.4), he cites only Torras v. Stradley, 103
F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952), which, if carefully analyzed, will be seen as in accord with
the Smith case. Cf. Balcker v. Comm'r, 275 F.2d '141 (5th Cir. 1960). On p. 13 of the
Department of Justice Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in Larche
v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1959), the Torras case is cited for the astonishing
proposition that § 6 "does not apply to investigatory proceedings." The argument that § 6
applies only to agencies which are sometimes subject to "the principal provisions of the
Act" (§§ 4, 5, 7, and 8?) would cover § 3 as well as § 6; and Congress patently wanted
§ 3 to apply very broadly.
17 Hearings on Federal Registrars, supra note 6, at 631. The word "authority" appears
to have been intended to exclude "mere 'housekeeping' functions." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE APA 253 (1946).
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When a commission has authority to issue subpenas, when "action" is
defined in the APA to include any "requirement . . . affecting the freedom
of any person"' 8 and the "taking of other compulsory or restrictive action,"
and when the Congress has spelled out over-all prescriptions for investigations
and subpenas, to argue that that commission has no "atithority to act with
respect to the matters later defined" seems perverse.
True Exemptions
Are any agencies, then, exempt from the APA? Yes, because under Section
2(a) "agency" does not include "Congress, the courts, or the governments of
the possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia." Those words pre-
sumably cover congressional committees, administrative officials of the courts,
and a host of bureaucrats in the District of Columbia, Guam, and elsewhere.
There may be doubt as to some borderline groups like the General Accounting
Office." But, "the term 'agency' includes the President, cabinet members, and
other executive officers. It includes even the military ... ""
The only other general exemptions are these; and by section 2(a), they
are not excluded from section 3, which deals with "public information":21
(1) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of repre-
sentatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined
by them;
(2) courts martial and military commissions;
(3) military or naval authority exercised in the field in time of
war or in occupied territory; or
(4) functions which by law expired on the termination of World
War II hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter, or before
July 1, 1947, and the functions conferred by several named
statutes. 2
2
18 "That a person compelled to appear and testify or produce papers is thereby deprived
of his liberty land his property is so clear as to need no demonstration." Lilienthal, The
Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony, 39 HARv. L. Rav. 694, 708 (1926);
cf. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950) ("the 'right to be let alone
- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men' . . . ex-
tends to the orderly taking under compulsion of process").
19 See Survey and Study of Administrative Organization, Procedure, and Practice in
the Federal Agencies by the House Committee on Government Operations: Agency Response
to Questionnaire (Com. Print Dec. 1957) Part I1B, p. 1569. I think it is preposterous to'
argue that the GAO is "Congress" and that in 1946 - had the question been raised - those
congressmen who quarter-backed the APA would have said, for example, "Yes, we are will-
ing to exempt the GAO from the requirement that regulations be published in the Federal
Register."
Is the Parole Board included among "the courts," or otherwise exempt? I would say not.
But see Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 46 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950); cf. Lesser v. Humphrey, 89 F. Supp. 474 (M.D. Pa.
1950) (Good Time Board); Kennedy Name Plate Co. v. Comm'r, 170 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.
1948) (Tax Court).
20 4 DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE 81 (1958); and see Parker, The President
as the Head of the Executive-Administrative Hierarchy: A Survey, 8 J. Pun. L. 437 (1959);
Kam Koon Wan v. E.E. Black, Ltd., 75 F. Supp. 553, 561 (D. Ha. 1948).
21 Unhappily, and notwithstanding the care of Congress in listing the all-but- Section 3
exemptions, some agencies believe they can hoist themselves into this category by inference.
See House Committee Survey cited supra note 19, Part 11C, p. 1732 (FHA); Part liD, p.
2015 (Small Business Administration); p. 2049 (Tariff Commission); cf. p. 2035 (U.S.
Information Agency); Part 11A, p. 1203 (Export-Import Bank).
22 Among these are the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, Surplus Property Act of 1944,
Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946, Housing and Rent Act of 1947, Second Decontrol
Act of 1947, Rubber Act of 1948 (subject to § 10 of APA as well as § 3), Export Control
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Does It Matter Whether the Civil Rights Commission Is Exempt from the APA?
The Supreme Court ruled in Hannah v. Larche that the Civil Rights Com-
mission was not governed by section 7 of the APA.Y The ruling patently is
correct because section 7 applies to determinations "required by statute to be
made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," and the Com-
mission does not make that kind of determination.
There are other provisions of the APA that do govern the Commission.
By full compliance with those provisions the Commission would not hamper
its functions and might even enhance its repute. To illustrate: Is there any
persuasive reason why its procedural rules and statements of general policy
should not be published in the Federal Register? 4 Should it ignore the re-
quirement that, "so far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, any
interested person may appear . . . for the presentation, adjustment, or de-
termination of any issue, request, or controversy . . ."?
Further, by its presumed exemption the commission avoids some difficult
interpretive questions that perhaps should be met and resolved. Those arise
out of section 6 of the APA and words there that differ from words of similar
aim in section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Under section 102(c), for
example, "witnesses at the hearings may be accompanied by their own counsel
for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights." Did
Congress thereby intend to limit this more complete guarantee of APA section
6(a): "Any person compelled to appear in person ...shall be accorded the
right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel . . ."? The
question is not an easy one when we take into account the command of APA
section 12 that "no subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify
the provisions of this Act, except to the extent that such legislation shall do
so expressly. 2 5 Similarly, what is the relation between section 102(i) of the
Civil Rights Act ("a witness may obtain a transcript copy of his testimony
...given at an executive session, when authorized by the Commission")
and APA section 6(b) ("in a nonpublic investigatory proceeding-the witness
may for good cause be limited to inspection of the official transcript")? Could
the right to inspect the transcript of one's own testimony at an executive session
lawfully be denied?
It is hoped that the commission may heed these words and revise its course
in the minor ways proposed. It is hoped too that the Department of Justice,
much more importantly, will forego its search for niggardly interpretations
Act of 1949, International Wheat Agreement Act of 1949 (subject to § 10 of APA as well
as § 3), Defense Production Act of 1950, Renegotiation Act of 1951, Alteration of Bridges
Act of 1952, Universal Military Training and Service Act, Federal Coal Mine Safety Act,
and an act providing reimbursement for losses resulting from construction of military in-
stallations; cf. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950; §§ 108 and 181 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954; and see generally, HOOVER CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3.
23 363 U.S. 420, 452 (1960); cf. note 5 supra. The LAWYER writer states, "The APA
• exempts from its procedural requirements such matters as are subject to a later trial
de novo." He cites § 5. 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 440, 441 (1960). That exemption covers
only §§ 5, 7, and 8; and many other procedural requirements of the Act are not affected.
Cf. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 715 n.12 (9th Cir. 1955).
24 For a sample statement of general policy see Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 424
(1960).
25 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955).
